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Response
RETRIBUTIVISM FOR PROGRESSIVES: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR FLANDERS
DAVID GRAY* and JONATHAN HUBER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The population of persons incarcerated in the United States
again reached a record high in 20081: 2,424,279.2  That total treats
“incarcerated” broadly and includes “inmates held in . . . U.S. territo-
ries, military facilities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) owned and contracted facilities, jails in Indian country, and ju-
venile facilities.”3  Narrowing the focus a bit, federal and state adult
prisons and local jails incarcerated a total of 2,304,115 individuals in
2008.4  Federal and state prisons had custody of over 1,610,446 indi-
viduals, of whom 1,540,036 were serving sentences of one year or
more.5
Comparing the 2,304,115 total to the overall population yields an
incarceration rate of 754 adult inmates for every 100,000 adult re-
sidents.6  Ninety-three percent of the 1,610,446 prisoners held in fed-
eral and state prisons were men.7  Men aged twenty-five to twenty-nine
represented the largest percentage of those serving sentences of a year
Copyright  2010 by David Gray and Jonathan Huber.
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** J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law.  The authors thank
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on these issues, and Frank Lancaster for heroic administrative support.  Jonathan Huber
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1. See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 228417, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008, at 1 & fig.1 (rev. 2010), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.
2. Id. at 8 tbl.9.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 2 tbl.1.  The vast majority of the difference is comprised of persons held in
local jails and persons held in juvenile facilities. See id. at 8 tbl.9.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 2.
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\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-DEC-10 14:37
142 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:141
or more—17.2%8—but with an incarceration rate of only 2,238 per
100,000, men in that age range ranked second to men aged thirty to
thirty-four, who were incarcerated at a rate of 2,366 per 100,000.9
Among men serving sentences in federal and state prisons, 38%
were black, 34% were white, and 20% were Hispanic,10 with the conse-
quence that white men were serving sentences of a year or more at a
rate of 487 per 100,000, Hispanic men at a rate of 1,200 per 100,000,
and black men at a rate of 3,161 per 100,000.11  Another “4,270,917
adult men and women were on probation and 828,169 were on parole
or mandatory conditional release following a prison term.”12  All told,
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, at the end of 2008 “over
7.3 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole,”
constituting “3.2% of all U.S. adult residents or one in every 31
adults.”13
Many of these individuals were serving lengthy prison sentences,
often for drug crimes. Of the 79,904 defendants convicted and sen-
tenced between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006, about 80%
were sentenced to terms of incarceration.14  The average sentence im-
posed for state felony offenses in 2006 was 59 months.15  The average
sentence imposed in the federal system was approximately 64
months.16  Of state felony convictions, 33.4% were for drug offenses
compared to 18.2% for violent offenses and 28.4% for property of-
fenses.17  In both the federal and state systems, more than 95% of
persons convicted for murder or non-negligent manslaughter were
sentenced to prison.18  The mean maximum sentence length for those
prosecuted by states for these crimes was 244 months—though it was
only 124 months in the federal system.19  For drug offenses, 65% of
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 5 tbl.6.
12. Office of Justice Programs, Total Correctional Population, BJS: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
(Oct. 9, 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11.
13. Id.
14. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 225711, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.5.1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.us
doj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf.
15. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 226846, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS: STATISTICAL TABLES, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM: FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
16. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 14, at tbl.5.2. R
17. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 15, at tbl.1.1. R
18. Id. at tbl.1.6.
19. Id.
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persons convicted in state courts received prison terms, with a mean
maximum of 31 months (23 months for possession, 38 months for
trafficking).20  By contrast, 93% of those convicted of felony drug of-
fenses in the federal system were sentenced to prison terms, with a
mean maximum of 87 months (48 months for possession, 87 months
for trafficking).21
For those who are incarcerated, life is exceptionally unpleasant.
Imprisonment entails extensive inherent constraint on movement and
freedom, often for twenty-three hours a day.  In addition, overcrowd-
ing,22 aging facilities, and violence make life in most prisons and jails
exceptionally dangerous.  In 2007, 4.5% of prisoners in state and fed-
eral adult facilities reported being victimized sexually, often at the
hands of staff.23  Of minors detained in juvenile facilities nationwide,
12% reported being sexually victimized from 2008 to 2009, most of
the time at the hands of facility staff.24  Just as is the case with sexual
assault outside prison, most experts assume that these numbers reflect
dramatic underreporting.25  Non-sexual assaults are, of course, much
more common, though accurate statistics are hard to find.26
This long string of statistics can be summed up quite simply: In
the United States, there are a lot of people who are incarcerated for a
considerable period of time in unpleasant and often dangerous condi-
tions.  But do these statistics bespeak a criminal justice system that is
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. SABOL ET AL., supra note 1, at 44–45 app. tbl.24.  In 2008, the federal system was R
operating at 135% of capacity and almost half of the state systems were operating above
capacity. Id.
23. ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 219414, BU-
REAU OF PRISON STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003: SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES 2007, at 1–2 (rev.
2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf.
24. ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 228416, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY
YOUTH 2008–09, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svjfry
09.pdf.
25. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDEN-
ING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 61 (2003) [hereinafter WHITMAN, HARSH JUS-
TICE] (stating that the “real prevalence” of sexual assault in “high-security American
carceral institutions” is “essentially impossible to determine”); see also JAMES BYRNE, COMMIS-
SION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS: SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY 5 (2006), available
at http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/byrne_james_m.pdf (estimating that in-
cidents of prison violence, both physical and sexual, are underreported by at least a factor
of ten).
26. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM’N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE
IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 24 (2006), available at http://www.
prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_Confinement.pdf.
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excessively “harsh”?  Professor James Q. Whitman is on record for be-
lieving that they do.27  He is particularly struck by the wide disparities
between sentencing patterns in the United States and sentencing pat-
terns in other developed Western nations.28  While the pantheon of
those responsible for harsh justice in the United States is many and
diverse, Whitman reserves special blame for retributivism, which he
regards as inherently harsh.29  In his view, the ascendency of retributi-
vism in the latter half of the twentieth century has justified criminal
justice laws, policies, and practices that have led us inevitably to our
current situation and have saddled us with a criminal justice system
that is far too harsh.30  It follows, on his view, that for progressive
agendas to proceed in the criminal justice field, critics, theorists, activ-
ists, and policymakers must reject retributivism as a theory of criminal
justice.
In his important Article, Professor Chad Flanders takes up Whit-
man’s gauntlet, asking the question Whitman largely begs: Is retribu-
tive justice inherently harsh?31  This is surely the right question.  After
all, theory is often the victim in public policy circles where politicians
and policymakers too frequently misconstrue, misapply, or misrepre-
sent theory—or even facts—in post hoc efforts to justify their views
and reactions.  If retributivism has been systematically abused for half
a century to justify harsh criminal justice policy, then the solution for
progressives may not be to abandon retributivism.  Flanders ultimately
concludes that many theories that purport to be retributivist are harsh
but finds that others may not be.32  In the latter category, Flanders is
particularly attracted to Augustine and Adam Smith, who advance re-
tributivism as a machinery for rational restraint against emotional
drives for vengeance by setting upper limits on punishment to avoid
harsh outcomes.33
While we share many of Flanders’s views, we think that his discus-
sion is incomplete in important ways and that he leaves in the ground
27. See James Q. Whitman, What Happened to Tocqueville’s America?, 74 SOC. RES. 251,
251–52 (2007) (discussing “America’s sorry place on the far harsh end of the punishment
spectrum”).
28. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 29 (2005).
29. See James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85–89
(2003) [hereinafter Whitman, Plea].
30. See id. (“The old belief in rehabilitation, which was closely associated with indeter-
minate sentencing, has been widely abandoned.  In its place has come the triumph of
American neo-retributivism.”).
31. See generally Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010).
32. See id. at 109–33.
33. See id. at 124–33.
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significant retributivist resources progressives might like to exploit.
Foremost, he does not—and so far as we can find, neither does Whit-
man—define in clear terms what harsh means in his discussion.34
Given the centrality of harshness as a metric for measuring criminal
justice policies and outcomes in their discussions, we think this is a
fundamental omission.  In Part II of this Response, we explore briefly
some of the possibilities and settle on harsh as a pass-through term for
disproportionate, though perhaps with some aesthetic overtones.
Having identified more clearly the normative core of a harshness
charge, we turn in Part III to a brief analysis of the American criminal
justice system using the theory of punishment held by perhaps the
most prominent Enlightenment retributivist: Immanuel Kant.  This
discussion leads us to the conclusion that the American criminal jus-
tice system is indeed harsh.  However, we think that American justice
is harsh as measured by retributive standards and that it would be less
harsh if policymakers took more seriously the constraints on punish-
ment that retributivism recommends.35
While Whitman and Flanders focus on punishment, we conclude
that retributivists should regard American justice as harsh in at least
three regards.  First, contemporary criminal codes are far too expan-
sive by retributivist standards, leading to broad overcriminalization
and dramatic increases in crime, violence, and rates of imprison-
ment.36  Second, many sentences imposed in the United States are
disproportionate to the crimes to which they are nominally at-
tached.37  Third, prison conditions in many state and federal facilities
are harsh insofar as inmates are made to suffer unjustified harm.38  In
Part IV we briefly expand upon these conclusions.  We conclude by
returning to the question at the core of the discussion Flanders began:
Is retributivism harsh or progressive?  We think that it is progressive,
or at least has the potential to be, and we hope that our efforts here
will provide modest contributions to the valuable conversation Flan-
ders advances in his Article.
II. WHAT IS “HARSH”?
If the point of the conversation is to determine whether current
criminal law and policy in the United States is harsh and whether re-
tributivism is inherently or contingently harsh, it seems important as a
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. See infra Part IV.C.
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threshold matter to be clear about what harsh means.  Neither Flan-
ders nor, so far as we can tell, Whitman provide a succinct definition
of this central term.39  However, their use of the word provides mate-
rial for a useful reverie.
Many of Whitman’s and Flanders’s uses of harsh seem to be aes-
thetic: Harsh is applied to conditions and conduct that make us
shiver.  Being in prison in America seems to be extremely unpleasant
in almost every respect.40  The physical conditions are uncomfortable:
There is little daylight, the air is stagnant, the beds consist of thin
mattresses, the food is terrible, and there are extreme physical threats
from fellow prisoners and staff.  Harsh in this sense stands shoulder-
to-shoulder with mean, ugly, and perhaps cruel.  Discussions of prison
conditions in Flanders’s and Whitman’s works fall into this category of
usage.  Here harsh carries a strong emotional valence and seems cal-
culated to evoke an intestinal reaction.41
The problem with harshness as an aesthetic is that it is highly
subjective.  We might share some sensibilities with Flanders and Whit-
man that would lead us to agree that much of our current punishment
practice is quite ugly indeed, but that delightful happenstance leaves
us without much to say to those who feel charged pride when they
survey the same practices and policies that inspire shame in us.  That
unpromising prospect looms large given broad support in the Ameri-
can electorate for many of the policies responsible for the current tab-
leau.  Public celebrations of figures like Joe Arpaio, the fifth-term
sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, who has built a controversial
39. See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 32–39 (attempting to define R
“[h]arshness in criminalizing conduct,” “subjecting numerous classes of persons to potential crimi-
nal liability,” “grading,” “inflexible doctrines of criminal liability,” “enforcement,” “the law of punish-
ment,” “the application of punishment,” and “the inflexibility of punishment”).
40. See id. at 59–62 (discussing the trend in American prisons “toward a growing harsh-
ness” that is bolstered by “drastic overcrowding, inmate-on-inmate violence, and guard-on-
inmate violence,” as well as “[h]omosexual rape, in particular”); Flanders, supra note 31, at R
95–96.  We limit our observation to “seems to be” because we are fortunate enough not to
have first-hand knowledge.  We suspect that most observers would agree that prison is en-
tirely undesirable, unpleasant, and misery inducing, but we must acknowledge a robust
debate about precisely whether the subjective negative experience of prison, including ad-
aptation to prison conditions, should impact sentencing policies and practices. See John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur,
Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); David Gray,
Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with the Maryland
Law Review) [hereinafter Gray, Punishment as Suffering]; Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Ben-
tham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2010);  Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David Gray, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive
Justice Right, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
41. See supra note 40. R
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public image around his commitment to law enforcement practices
and maintenance of jail conditions that Whitman and Flanders likely
would identify as harsh, only add to the pall.42  Harsh as an aesthetic
therefore seems a rather thin and unpromising foundation upon
which to build a progressive agenda.  It certainly provides no grounds
for Flanders’s claim that “[r]egardless of a theory’s elegance, and even
its truth or falsity, a theory of punishment that does not give us clear
resources to condemn our current system of punishment—its long
sentences, its mass imprisonment, its degrading conditions—is not a
theory worth taking seriously.”43  Quite to the contrary, this seems to
get things backward.
At other times, harsh seems to reflect a comparison of American
punishment practices to those of other nations.  Whitman is particu-
larly drawn to this usage and spills considerable ink elaborating a
sociohistorical narrative of punishment practices in Europe and the
United States.44  Without dwelling on the substance of these compari-
sons, we will simply point out that harsh as a comparative concept also
fails to advance the progressive ball.  As Whitman notes, “What counts
as ‘harsh’ depends on the sensibilities and structures of a given soci-
ety.”45  So, while American punishment may seem harsh from a Euro-
pean point of view, American sensibilities may find European policy
and practice too lenient, compromising, and accommodating to
criminals; and that is pretty much the end of the debate.  Further,
given current skepticism of European practices and sensibilities
among the American electorate,46 pinning progressive hopes to an
agenda of Europeanization seems a particularly dim prospect.
42. See generally William Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2009, at 42 (discuss-
ing “Arpaio’s theatre of cruelty”).
43. See Flanders, supra note 31, at 137.  Quite to the contrary, we think that gets the R
order of burdens exactly backward.
44. See, e.g., WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 19 (“American punishment is R
comparatively harsh, comparatively degrading, comparatively slow to show mercy.”); Flan-
ders, supra note 31, at 131 n.253.  We are also deeply skeptical of Whitman’s painting of R
European society, politics, and history in such broad strokes. See, e.g., WHITMAN, HARSH
JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 13 (“Why are the values of mercy so much stronger in continental R
Europe?”).  Europe is composed of diverse states, many of which are further subdivided by
language, culture, and history.  Whitman does spend some time focusing on a few coun-
tries in particular (Germany, for example), which we think is a much more promising
approach to comparative analysis. See, e.g., id. at 69–95.
45. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 32. R
46. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1635–36
(2009) (criticizing that “[a] lengthy tradition in American law looks to the Continental,
inquisitorial system of criminal adjudication for negative guidance about our own ideal”).
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At other times, Whitman and Flanders use harsh to mean “deter-
minate” or “inflexible.”47  This is a common critique of retributivism,
to which Martha Nussbaum, among others, has given persuasive
voice.48  There is no doubt that determinacy and inflexibility are a
sustained fashion in American criminal justice.  From 1987 until 2005,
sentencing in the federal system was governed by the mandatory Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines with the expressed purpose of limiting
flexibility and discretion in sentencing.49  In 2005, the Supreme Court
rendered the Guidelines “advisory,” but district courts still must “con-
sider” them;50 in practice, the vast majority of sentences remain within
Guidelines ranges or higher;51 and most circuit courts of appeals have
endorsed Guidelines range sentences as presumptively reasonable
47. See, e.g., WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE supra note 25, at 35, 49 (emphasis omitted); Flan- R
ders, supra note 31, at 93. R
48. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 115 (1993)
(describing retributivism as “brutal in its neglect of human complexity”).  For an engaging
critical discussion of mercy in retributive theory, see Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1421 (2004).
49. Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial
Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 469 (2009).  It is worth noting that determinate
sentencing came to the fore in the face of broad skepticism about progressive sentencing
reforms of the mid-twentieth century. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS
OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 1–3 (2004), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf (outlining “the historical context of sen-
tencing reform”).
50. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
51. Erin P. Johnson, Advisory Guidelines and Lengthier Sentences: Relevant Conduct Sentenc-
ing as an Increasingly Harmful Sentencing Practice Post-Booker, 1 HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION
L. REV. 147, 148–49 (2008) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT
OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf).
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when reviewing district court judgments.52  More than half of states
also utilize guidelines schemes.53
In addition to sentencing guidelines, legislatures in recent de-
cades have passed a raft of criminal statutes with mandatory minimum
sentences attached.54  Many states have followed the federal lead by
severely limiting or eliminating early release, particularly for violent
offenders.55  As a consequence of these efforts, American criminal
punishment is indeed increasingly inflexible, but it is hard to see how
that determinacy alone makes it harsh.  Without appeal to another
standard, it is impossible to tell whether a determinate sentencing
scheme is inflexibly lenient, inflexibly harsh, or fortuitously just right
in all cases despite its inflexibility.  Moreover, the raison d’eˆtre of de-
52. See United States v. Favara, Nos. 09-2589 & 09-2593, 2010 WL 3155891, at *4 (7th
Cir. Aug. 11, 2010) (stating that a district court’s sentence within the Guidelines range is
presumed to be reasonable); accord United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir.
2009); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 68
(2008); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v.
Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717–18
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gonzalez, 134 F. App’x 595, 596–97 (3d Cir. 2005) (un-
published decision). But see United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1107 (11th Cir.)
(“Although we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-guidelines
sentences, when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range,
we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), petition for cert. filed, (July 30, 2010) (No. 10-5864); United States v. Carty, 520
F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir.) (declining to establish a presumption of reasonableness), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1061 (2008); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006)
(declining “to establish any presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, that a Guidelines sen-
tence is reasonable”).  While the Supreme Court has endorsed the practice of circuit
courts affording a presumption of reasonableness to Guidelines range sentences imposed
by trial courts, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), it has rejected attempts by
trial courts to indulge in a presumption that a sentence within the Guidelines range is
reasonable, see Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009) (per curiam).
53. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leni-
ency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519,
520 n.5 (2009) (“Close to half of the states had followed the federal model post-1984 and
enacted some form of [sentencing] guidelines.”).
54. Cathi J. Hurt, Note, Juvenile Sentencing: Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation
on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 621, 626 (1999) (explaining that “mandatory minimum sentencing” has become “prev-
alent in both the state and federal sentencing schemes”).
55. See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF
TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON
POPULATIONS: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 17–23 (2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf (noting that twenty-one
states have followed the federal lead and have limited or eliminated early release for vio-
lent offenders).  Florida’s statute abolishing parole, for instance, was a source of some
concern for the Supreme Court in its recent decision to bar life sentences for juveniles
without “some realistic opportunity to obtain release.”  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2034 (2010); Act Effective Oct. 1, 1998, ch. 204, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 204, invalidated by
Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.
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terminate sentencing schemes is equality and comparative proportion-
ality.56  These are weighty interests that seem well served by limiting
discretion and flexibility in sentencing.  Determinacy and inflexibility
alone therefore seem not to provide firm grounds either for Whit-
man’s and Flanders’s critical efforts or for progressive reform
programs.
“Detached from the purpose of punishment” is another possibil-
ity.  For instance, if the purpose of punishment was solely to rehabili-
tate offenders,57 then it certainly would be harsh if the criminal system
provided no rehabilitative services or indeed made ex-convicts less
likely to be able to reintegrate into society by inflicting permanent
psychological damage or branding them with a sort of scarlet letter.
While more promising than other uses, this application of harsh
leaves unresolved the question of what the purpose of punishment
should be.  Absent an answer to that highly charged and hotly debated
question, we cannot hope to determine whether, and to what extent,
current criminal practice in the United States is detached from the
purpose of punishment.
While this conversation could go on for a while, we will take a
shortcut to what we think is the most likely conclusion: Harsh is a pass-
through term for disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.  Only by
incorporating this normative standard do we think that labeling a
punishment or a system of punishment as harsh can back a demand
for reform.  Moreover, it seems to us that proportionality is what lies
behind the other ways Whitman and Flanders use harsh.  Dispropor-
tionate punishment is likely to sponsor a negative emotional response.
Grossly disproportionate punishment is likely to be nauseating.  Sen-
tencing schemes that by virtue of their inflexibility impose dispropor-
tionate punishment by barring consideration of relevant facts can
fairly be called harsh.58  Other practices condemned by Whitman, in-
cluding criminalization, grading, enforcement, application, etc. follow
56. Cf. D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 453,
465 (2007) (explaining that “the American public as stakeholder depends upon [courts] to
articulate publicly the principles that control a sentence, [and] to monitor and expose
prosecutorial failure to fulfill congressional goals such as proportionality and equality”).
57. The juvenile justice system, for example, has often been characterized as having a
rehabilitative purpose. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of
Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 516
(2009) (“Because of their immaturity, rehabilitation—rather than punishment—should be
the overriding social purpose when juveniles are involved in antisocial or criminal
activity.”).
58. See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 35 (explaining that a system which R
“appl[ies] unvarying punishments regardless of any sense of the individual deserts of of-
fenders” may “be called relatively harsh”).
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the same pattern.59  Alone, these practices cannot fairly be called
harsh.  What makes them harsh, if they are, is that they result in pun-
ishments that are disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.  Absent
that conclusion, there simply is nothing to the charge of harshness,
and certainly nothing that could demand or justify progressive
reform.
The same is true for perhaps the most important use of harsh in
Whitman’s work.  At the center of Whitman’s historical diagnosis is his
claim that American justice has consistently been implicated in
broader social systems organized around the production and mainte-
nance of structural status inequalities.60  One of us has written on the
role of status inequality in the production and justification of system-
atic violence and injustice, so we are in no small degree sympathetic to
this concern.61  Again, however, we think the concern must reduce to
harshness as disproportion.  To make the point, let us assume that
Whitman is right and that American criminal justice is implicated in a
broader system for the production and maintenance of status inequal-
ity.  Now let us further assume that, despite this systemic injustice,
each of the individual punishments inflicted by that system is abso-
lutely correct as determined by some standard of justice external to
the system of injustice.  In such a circumstance, we have a hard time
seeing how the systemic status inequality critique could suggest, much
less demand, any real progressive changes to punishment practices.
That goal requires a clear standard for measuring the results of crimi-
nal processes in individual cases.  Broad condemnation of the system
is neither sufficient to that critical task nor to the challenge of propos-
ing and justifying specific reform.
Progressives such as Whitman, Flanders, and us find many of our
current criminal justice policies and practices harsh.  We do not think,
however, that these opinions are nothing more than our idiosyncratic
aesthetic views.  Neither do we think that we ought to conform our
criminal law and punishment practices to European fashions simply
because they are European.  Finally, while we are deeply concerned
that broad racial, gender, and class trends in the criminal justice sys-
59. Id. at 33–35.
60. Id. at 19–32.
61. See, e.g., David Gray, Constitutional Faith and Dynamic Stability: Thoughts on Religion,
Constitutions, and Transitions to Democracy, 69 MD. L. REV. 26 (2009); David Gray, Extraordi-
nary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); David Gray & Benjamin Levin, Feminist
Perspectives on Extraordinary Justice, in CONFLICT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: FEMINIST AP-
PROACHES (Martha Fineman & Estell Zinsstag eds.) (forthcoming 2011); David C. Gray, A
No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1043 (2010).
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tem evidence systemic distributional injustice,62 we fail to see how
those concerns can justify objections to particular sentences and
therefore to broader sentencing arrangements.  Rather, we think that
we have good reasons to condemn as harsh much of current criminal
policy in the United States because it results in punishments that are
disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.63  To make that claim re-
quires reliance on a theory of criminal punishment.  Whitman and, to
a lesser degree, Flanders think that there is no safe harbor for our
progressive instincts in retributivism.  Quite to the contrary, they think
that retributivism is part of the problem.64  We disagree.  In the next
Part, we explain why.
III. AMERICAN JUSTICE IS HARSH BY RETRIBUTIVIST STANDARDS
In our view, many criminal punishments in the United States are
harsh in the sense that they are disproportionate or otherwise unjusti-
fied.65  The most significant category of these harsh punishments is a
consequence of dramatic overcriminalization.66  This is a view we
share with Whitman;67 but contrary to Whitman we think that retribu-
tivism supports our view and provides good grounds for progressive
reform.  We also believe that retributivism provides ample ammuni-
tion to criticize many current punishment policies, which result in dis-
proportionate punishment or unjustified harm.  We think that
Immanuel Kant’s approach to retributivism is particularly well suited
62. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004) (explaining that young
African-American men are disproportionately represented in the prison population).
63. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Congress Moves to Narrow Cocaine Sentencing Disparities, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/politics/29crack.html (ex-
plaining that the House of Representatives passed a bill to reduce disparities in mandatory
federal sentences for crack and powder cocaine violations to help correct an “unjustified”
sentencing disparity that results in different prison terms for black and white individuals);
see also Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge’s Dilemma, 23 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 823, 824 (1998) (explaining that the Guidelines system and its mandatory
minimums were supposed to confine judicial discretion to avoid disproportionate punish-
ment to minority defendants and offenders, but the result has been the opposite).
64. See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 38 (“[R]etributivism is a theory that R
has proven to be consistent with many possible forms of harshness.”); Flanders, supra note
31, at 111–13; Whitman, Plea, supra note 29, at 89–94. R
65. See supra note 63. R
66. Cf. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005)
(summarizing that overcriminalization consists of “grossly disproportionate punishments,”
“untenable offenses,” “superfluous statutes,” and “doctrines that overextend culpability,”
among others).
67. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE supra note 25, at 33–34. R
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to this critique, and we use this Part to provide a brief overview of his
views.68
Kant’s theory of punishment is linked to his moral theory.  The
categorical imperative is at the center of Kant’s moral theory.69  There
are several formulations, but the most commonly cited is that “I
should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my
maxim should become a universal law.”70  To fully understand what
this means, we must first understand the terms “will” and “maxim.”71
Our capacities to reason are many and varied.  Among the most im-
portant is instrumental reason.72  If one wants to achieve a certain
end, then instrumental reason instructs one on the course of action
best suited to that end based on considerations of effectiveness and
efficiency.73  The recommendations of instrumental reason come in a
familiar “If . . . then” form as hypothetical imperatives.74  Instrumental
reason, however, has little to say when the question is one of deciding
among possible goals or principles of action.75  This is instead the do-
main of morality and ethics.76
It is worth a moment to distinguish between ethical and moral
judgments.  “Ethics,” for present purposes, refers to conceptions of
the good life.  There are, on this definition, a variety of competing
and often mutually exclusive visions of the good life that one might
choose for oneself just as there are unique conceptions of the good
indigenous to different identities and endeavors.  In general, Kant’s
categorical imperative offers no counsel when deciding among ca-
reers, life partners, and paint colors.  Rather, the categorical impera-
tive is a tool for discovering the moral law, which for Kant is a set of
universal prohibitions on conduct—categorical imperatives—that we
have a moral duty as rational beings to respect no matter our ethical
dispositions.77
To determine whether an act is morally permissible, one must
first identify the maxim of that act.  A maxim is “[a] rule that the
68. For a more expansive exegesis of Kant’s retributivism, see Gray, Punishment as Suf-
fering, supra note 40. R
69. Id. (manuscript at 46).
70. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Elling-
ton trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785) [hereinafter, KANT, GROUNDING].
71. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 143). R
72. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 12–13 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].
73. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 143). R
74. KANT, GROUNDING, supra note 70, at 25. R
75. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 12–13. R
76. Id. at 13–14.
77. Id. at 17; Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 143–44). R
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agent himself makes his principle [of action] on subjective
grounds.”78  When the maxim of a proposed action has been identi-
fied, agents must then inquire whether this maxim can be universal-
ized without contradiction.79  The universal law formulation of the
categorical imperative is therefore a test that agents use to determine
whether the maxim of an act entails its own contradiction.80  If a
maxim fails the test, then an agent must, as part of his moral duty,
refrain from acting upon it.81
Theft provides an easy example.  The maxim of theft is taking
another’s property.82  To determine whether theft is moral, the agent
must ask whether the maxim “I take that which is not mine” can be
universalized without contradiction.83  The answer is “no” because the
maxim “I take that which is not mine” stands in contradiction to the
concept of ownership upon which the maxim depends.84  Theft is
therefore wrong because it contains its own contradiction.85  Ethical
justifications of a theft are, on this analysis, irrelevant.  There are cer-
tainly circumstances where doing the wrong act may be necessary to
achieve a specific goal.  No matter how respectable that goal, however,
theft remains immoral.86
In a perfect world, agents would respect their moral duties as an
ethical matter.87  Kant has no illusions about human nature, however,
so follows most contract theorists to the conclusion that justice re-
78. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 17–18.  An agent’s maxim of ac- R
tion is, by definition, available only to him but can be imputed to him based on his actions.
Id. at 18–19.
79. Id. at 18; Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 144). R
80. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 144). R
81. Id.
82. Id. (manuscript at 144–45).
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. In most cases, moral duty derives from background social practices. Id. (manu-
script at 145 & n.215).  Take a purely communist society, for example, where the maxim of
theft would make no sense because there is no understanding of mine and thine. Id.  Mur-
der and suicide, are two exceptions, however, that “would entail the destruction of human-
ity and the exercise of reason in general” if taken to their logical ends. Id. Society
therefore cannot condone or allow murder or suicide as a moral matter. Id.
86. It is likely that only the most naı¨ve agent would refuse to bear the moral weight of a
minor theft to prevent multiple deaths, say; but even if justified on this sort of “all things
considered” analysis, theft remains a moral wrong.  Thus, while it may be true that theft is
justified in some circumstances, the claim that theft is moral in some circumstances is falla-
cious. Cf. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 28 (making this point in the R
context of “necessity” killings).
87. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 312–13 (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., Macmillian Press LTD 1929) (1781) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON]
(“[I]n a perfect state no punishments whatsoever would be required.”); Gray, Punishment as
Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145). R
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quires an external authority, usually a sovereign state, to which we
grant authority to enforce the law.88  Like agents, states “are subject to
the commands of the categorical imperative.”89  Out of respect for
these obligations and constraints, a state can only subject citizens to
laws that respect their autonomy and are consistent with the freedom
of all.90  Punishment that seeks to effect or promote extraneous goods
for criminals or for society is forbidden91 because it offends respect
for autonomy as the foundation of a just society.92  The state, however,
has a duty to punish where punishment is deserved.93
This raises the question of what punishment is deserved when an
agent breaks the law.94  Kant’s answer is “the principle of equality (in
the position of the needle on the scale of justice), to incline no more
to one side than to the other.”95  By its terms, a crime is a contradic-
tion that imperils the moral community.96  To right Kant’s metaphori-
cal needle, the contradiction must be resolved on terms contained
within the maxim of the crime upon which the offender acts.97  Just
punishment therefore demands no more and no less than “expiation
of the contradiction posed by the criminal and his crime.”98  Accord-
ingly, “Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure
and therefore deprives himself (by the principle of retribution) of se-
curity in any possible property.”99
88. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in KANT: PO-
LITICAL WRITINGS 93, 105, 112–13 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1991); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 87–91
(Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Brothers 1960) (1794); Gray,
Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145). R
89. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145); see also KANT, CRI- R
TIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 87, at 312; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of R
Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 521, 527–28 (1987).
90. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 87, at 312; Gray, Punishment as Suffer- R
ing, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145). R
91. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 104–05; Gray, Punishment as Suffer- R
ing, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
92. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 241 (1971); Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra
note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
93. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 104–05; Gray, Punishment as Suffer- R
ing, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
94. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1968); Gray, Punishment as Suf-
fering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
95. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 105; Gray, Punishment as Suffering, R
supra note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
96. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 145–46). R
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 72, at 106. R
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This is all far too quick.  But this brief overview ought to be suffi-
cient to make two critical points.  First, retributivism recommends an
extremely parsimonious criminal code.  For Kant, and for many other
retributivists, criminal law is linked to the moral law.100  There are very
few maxims of conduct that contain their own contradiction and
therefore stand in logical opposition to fundamental norms.  Most are
familiar to students of the common law: homicide, rape, theft, and
fraud pretty much cover the territory.101  Each of these crimes violates
the categorical imperative and constitutes an abuse of a particular
kind of liberty, inclining the needle.  The just punishment for each of
these offenses is to constrain the liberty of the offender in kind and to
a degree necessary to right the needle.102
In modern states, regulatory offenses that identify and enforce
necessary rules of conduct for broad social enterprises may be added
to the criminal code, but punishments for violating the rules would,
by definition, be capped at exclusion from the enterprise.103  For ex-
ample, to engage in automobile transportation, we need a rule telling
people on which side of the road to drive.  Those who refuse to obey
that rule can certainly lose the privilege of driving, but they should
probably not be subject to imprisonment unless their refusal to obey
traffic laws also constitutes a core offense against public law.  Though
on a different scale, the same concept applies to a range of conduct
from producing corn flakes to operating nuclear power plants.  In all
circumstances, however, to justify criminal enforcement of a rule, that
rule must be essential to the enterprise such that allowing participants
to engage in the prohibited conduct would pose a contradiction to
that enterprise.
100. See, e.g., Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 148) (noting R
that “[l]ike Kant, John Rawls connects crime to moral rules”).
101. Kant draws some pretty fine lines here, at one point contending that embezzlement
is essentially a private wrong that should be resolved through private law, while theft is a
public wrong that is a proper target for the criminal law. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
supra note 72, at 105. R
102. See Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 40 (manuscript at 147). (arguing that R
“[t]he maxim of theft poses a contradiction to the concept of ownership” and that “the
proper legal punishment for an act of theft is to deny the offender access to property in a
form and to a degree commensurate with his offense”).
103. Cf. Luna, supra note 66, at 708–09 (explaining how “the rise of the modern admin- R
istrative state” has contributed to overcriminalization by “erecting a vast legal labyrinth
buttressed by criminal penalties in areas ranging from environmental protection and se-
curities regulation to product and workplace safety”).
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While woefully incomplete,104 this brief exegesis suggests that for
one of the most important contributors to the retributivist canon,105
American justice indeed is harsh in that it results in punishments that
are disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.  Books would be neces-
sary to sort through all of the possible targets, but we want to highlight
three broad areas of harshness identified by a retributive analysis that
we think many progressives are likely to embrace.  The first is pan-
demic overcriminalization.  States and the federal government have
used the criminal law to condemn and punish a variety of behavior
that is perfectly consistent with the freedom of all and therefore ought
not be subject to criminal punishment.106  In our opinion, any punish-
ment inflicted upon those who engage in such conduct is by defini-
tion “harsh.”  Second, we strongly suspect that much of our
sentencing practice results in punishments that are disproportionate
as measured by retributive standards.  Third, we think that conditions
in many prisons and jails in the United States inflict unjustified harm
on offenders.107
IV. PROGRESSIVE RETRIBUTIVISM
Judged by retributivist standards, American criminal justice is
harsh insofar as it punishes too many people, punishes too severely,
and inflicts additional unjustified harm on offenders.  In this Part, we
make the case briefly for each of these conclusions as examples of
harsh justice.
104. For more on the substantial debates among Kant scholars than this short presenta-
tion can possibly present, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Kant’s Theory of Criminal Punishment, in
RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82 (1979); B.
Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution, 8
L. & PHIL. 151 (1989); Samuel Fleischacker, Kant’s Theory of Punishment, in ESSAYS ON
KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (Howard Lloyd Williams ed., 1992); Murphy, supra note
89; Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262 (1983).  Among the live questions in R
these debates is whether Kant meant to limit the scope of the criminal law to state enforce-
ment of the moral law. See, e.g., Fleischacker, supra, 206–08 (exploring the role of the state
as moral enforcer).  We think there is good evidence that he did, or at least that his theory
entails this conclusion.  For present purposes, however, it is not necessary to untangle
these thorny exegetical questions.  Rather, the goal here is to offer an analytic perspective
on contemporary American criminal justice grounded in retributivist principles.
105. See John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130 (2009) (noting Kant’s
centrality in the punishment canon).
106. See generally Luna, supra note 66, at 703–12 (examining ways in which “[b]oth fed- R
eral and state governments have contributed over the past quarter century to a punish-
ment binge of unprecedented size and scope”).
107. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887 (2009) (noting that correctional facilities are “chronically over-
crowded and short-staffed” and that “[r]ape and other forms of coerced sexual conduct
are commonplace”).
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A. Overcriminalization: American Drug Laws Are Harsh by
Retributivist Standards
The many governments with police authority in the United States
have (as all governments do) a long list of conduct they would prefer
that citizens either refrain from or engage in.  It is always tempting for
officials invested in these social policies and the ethical visions that
animate them to use the criminal law as a tool for effecting their goals.
In the past half century, United States legislators have frequently in-
dulged this temptation, expanding dramatically the scope of the crim-
inal law from its traditional common law core.108  While various
consequentialist theories of criminal punishment may justify using the
criminal law to effect social policy in this way, retributivism does
not.109  This expansion of the criminal law is therefore harsh by re-
tributivist standards.  Among the most notable of these harsh uses of
the criminal law are decisions to punish those who use, possess, dis-
tribute, or produce intoxicating chemicals.
The maxims of action that lie behind the use, possession, produc-
tion, or distribution of intoxicating chemicals do not entail an inter-
nal contradiction and thus do not violate the categorical
imperative.110  Unlike murder and theft, these acts are entirely consis-
tent with the freedom of all.  From a retributive point of view, there-
fore, there seems no justification for punishing these acts as public
crimes.  There may well be beneficial economic or health policy rea-
sons to encourage abstinence or at least moderation in the use of in-
toxicating chemicals.  From a retributive point of view, however, those
interests simply do not justify the infliction of punishment.
The criminalization of intoxicating substances is heavily impli-
cated in the harshness of American criminal law.  In 2006, more than
33% of felony convictions in state courts were for drug offenses.111
The total number of felony convictions for drug crimes in the federal
and state systems that year was over 400,000.112  In 2006, 265,800, or
20%, of the total state prison population was composed of individuals
incarcerated solely for drug offenses.113  The federal system’s overall
prison population is smaller, but the role of drug crimes is even more
108. See generally, Luna, supra note 66. R
109. See Robert A. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 379, 381 (1978) (noting retributivism’s stance that “additional social-utilitarian goals
cannot morally justify the imposition of criminal sanctions”).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81 (discussing Kant’s categorical imperative). R
111. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 15, at 3 tbl.1.1. R
112. Id. at 9 tbl.1.6.
113. SABOL ET AL., supra note 1, at 37 app. tbls.15 & 16. R
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pronounced.  Out of the 182,333 individuals in federal prison in 2008,
a staggering 95,079, or 52%, were incarcerated solely for drug
crimes.114  Absent criminalization, we would have at least 365,000
fewer people in United States prisons and jails.  In addition, the
criminalization of drugs is responsible for a considerable number of
violent crimes and weapons offenses.  The latest figures we have found
for the United States classify 4.8% of murders committed nationwide
between 1991 and 1998 as drug-related.115  Earlier numbers from Bal-
timore, Maryland put that percentage at 48%.116  The percentage
reaches 90% in Mexico, where thousands of murders are committed
by Mexican drug cartels in their efforts to supply the United States
market.117  Those cartels routinely include police and government of-
ficials among their targets.  In addition, criminalization dramatically
inflates the price for drugs, which correlates with increases in property
crime.118
These statistics suggest that many fewer individuals would be in-
carcerated in the United States if drugs were decriminalized.  The
American experiment with alcohol prohibition makes the point.  Mur-
der and other acts of violence were routine features of the illegal alco-
hol trade,119 but as far as we can tell, nobody was murdered in the
United States last year in the competition between Miller and
Anheuser-Busch over beer supply, distribution centers, and market
share.  There also would be considerable cost savings of, conserva-
114. Id. at 38 app. tbl.17.
115. JOHN P. WALTERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, NO. NCJ 181056, FACT SHEET: DRUG-RELATED CRIME 4 tbl.4 (2000), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/ncj181056.pdf (“Drug-related
homicides are those murders that occurred specifically during a narcotics felony, such as
drug trafficking or manufacturing.”).
116. Edward Burns, Bulletin: Gang- and Drug-Related Homicide: Baltimore’s Successful Enforce-
ment Strategy, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE (July 2003), http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/bja/
gang/pfv.html (discussing crime statistics from 1988).
117. Traci Carl, Violence Indicates Progress in Mexico Drug War, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, Mar.
11, 2009, at A3.
118. Cf. DAVID SIMON & EDWARD BURNS, THE CORNER: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF AN INNER-
CITY NEIGHBORHOOD 185–93 (1998) (highlighting the role of property crimes in the world
of the corner-level drug trade); Carl, supra note 117 (noting recent spikes in cocaine prices R
and correlating increases in crime in Mexico).
119. See David L. Teasley, Drug Legalization and the “Lessons” of Prohibition, 19 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 27, 44 (1992) (describing “prolegalizers James Ostrowski and Milton Fried-
man[’s]” reliance on the rising murder rate during Prohibition, “reaching almost 10 per
100,000 in 1933, after which there was a rapid decline” to support their legalization posi-
tion). But see id. at 45 (“In a study of historical trends in violent crime, in the United States
during this period, Ted Robert Gurr concurs with the argument that the murder rate rose
but maintains that the increase was probably due mainly to a rise in the number of black
homicides.”).
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tively, $13 billion a year spent on incarcerating drug offenders and
another $40 to $50 billion a year spent on dedicated law enforcement
efforts.120  There is some concern that there might be an increase in
crimes perpetrated by people who are intoxicated.  For example, 1997
statistics show that about 22% of federal offenders and 33% of state
offenders reported being under the influence of drugs at the time of
their offenses.121  But any claim of a causal link is speculation at best;
and the relatively low correlation certainly is not sufficient to demon-
strate any criminality inherent in intoxication.  After all, incidents of
intoxication that are not associated with crime certainly far outnum-
ber those that are.  At any rate, retributivists have no objection to pun-
ishing those who perpetrate thefts or assaults while voluntarily
intoxicated.122
B. Sentencing Practice in the United States Is Harsh by Retributive
Standards
It is impossible here to do an exhaustive study of sentencing pol-
icy in the United States.  Nevertheless, painting in broad strokes sug-
gests that there are many sentencing policies and practices in the
United States that lead to disproportionate, and therefore harsh,
sentences as measured by retributive standards.  We are particularly
suspicious of the dramatic enhancements imposed under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and in many state systems for recidivist crimes.
The expansion of liability in conspiracy cases is also cause for concern.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for dramatic en-
hancements of sentence based on an offender’s criminal history, the
length of prior sentences, and whether the offender was on probation
or parole at the time of his offense.123  With a few relatively minor,
nonviolent offenses that are the stock-and-trade of street level hus-
tlers—such as possession of a vial or two of crack cocaine, sale of a vial
or two of crack cocaine, and petty theft—it is relatively easy for an
offender to build up the thirteen criminal history points necessary to
enter the highest Guidelines criminal history category, particularly if
his convictions are in a relatively short period of time.124  Once in the
120. See JEFFREY A. MIRON, DEP’T OF ECON., HARVARD UNIV., THE BUDGETARY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF DRUG PROHIBITION 1, 9, 24 app. tbl.B (2010), available at http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/miron/files/budget%202010%20Final.pdf.
121. WALTERS, supra note 115, at 3 tbl.2. R
122. Markel, supra note 48, at 1466 & n.137. R
123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(a)–(f) (2008).
124. See id. at §§ 4A1.1(a)–(f), 5A (providing for nonexclusive addition of criminal his-
tory points based on prior offenses, how recent those prior offenses are, and whether the
offender is on probation or otherwise in custody at the time of his most recent offense).
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highest criminal history category, the punishment for a petty theft
rises from zero to six months to twelve to eighteen months; the range
for possession of a vial or two of crack cocaine rises from ten to six-
teen months to thirty to thirty-seven months.125  That is an increase of
sentence somewhere between double and infinite.  Nearly half of the
states have passed like-minded statutes that provide similarly dramatic
enhancements of sentence for those deemed “habitual offenders.”126
The most notorious of these is California’s “Three Strikes and You’re
Out” law,127 which in one famous case led to a sentence of twenty-five
years to life for theft of three golf clubs worth a total of about
$1,200.128
The United States Sentencing Commission justifies such facially
disproportionate sentences on grounds that “[a] defendant with a re-
cord of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender
and thus deserving of greater punishment.”129  While there is much to
125. The base offense level for larceny of goods valued less than $5,000 is six. Id. at
§ 2B1.1 (a)–(b).  For petty thieves in criminal history category I, the Guidelines recom-
mend a sentence of zero to six months imprisonment. Id. at § 5A.  For those in criminal
history category VI, the recommended Guidelines sentencing range is twelve to eighteen
months. Id. The base offense level for possession of less than 500 milligrams of cocaine
base is twelve. Id. at § 2D1.1(c)(14).  For those convicted for possession of a vial of cocaine
base who are in criminal history category I, the recommended Guidelines sentencing
range is ten to sixteen months. Id. at § 5A.  For offenders in criminal category VI who are
convicted for possession of a vial of cocaine base, the sentencing range recommended by
the Guidelines is thirty to thirty-seven months. Id.
126. Cf. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug
Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2010) (“[B]etween 1993
and 1995, twenty-four states and the federal government enacted ‘three strikes laws.’  To-
day, all states and the federal system have statutory recidivism enhancements, and sentenc-
ing guideline regimes universally use criminal history as a primary factor—along with the
seriousness of the offense—in calculating sentencing ranges.” (footnotes omitted)).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)–(i) (West 2010); id. §§ 1170.12, 1192.7 (West 2004 &
West Supp. 2010); see also Naomi Harlin Goodno, Career Criminals Targeted: The Verdict Is In,
California’s Three Strikes Law Proves Effective, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 461, 462–65 (2007)
(outlining the enactment of California’s “Three Strikes Law”).
128. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19–20 (2003).  Proposition 36, a ballot initiative
passed by voters in 2000, modified California law to provide drug treatment for “first- and
second-time nonviolent, simple drug possession offenders” otherwise eligible for life
sentences. See About Prop 36, CAL. PROPOSITION 36, http://www.prop36.org/about.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2010); accord Jessica A. Levinson & Robert M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting
in California: The Band of the Golden State or an Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
689, 726 (2010).  A broader initiative to roll back the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law
by referendum failed in 2004. See State Ballot Measures: California General Election, November 2,
2004, CAL. SECRETARY ST.: KEVIN SHELLEY (Dec. 7, 2004, 6:14AM), http://vote2004.ss.ca.
gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (stating that Proposition 66, “3 Strikes Limits,” received 52.7%
no-votes).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2009).
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be said on the topic,130 we think that retributivists ought to be quite
skeptical of such a claim.  After all, the maxim of action that defines
an act as a crime does not change just because the offender has perpe-
trated the offense before.131  Neither does personal awareness of the
criminal punishment consequences of an act tighten the linkage be-
tween agent and act.132  If, upon closer examination, dramatic en-
hancements of sentence for recidivists are not justified on retributivist
grounds, then the sentencing practices of the federal government and
many states are harsh indeed because they result in disproportionate
sentences in many cases as measured by retributivist standards.
Enhanced sentences justified by expansions of conspiracy liability
also result in punishments that appear to be harsh by retributive stan-
dards.  A conspiracy is an agreement between one or more persons to
pursue an unlawful goal or to pursue a lawful goal through unlawful
means.133  Conspiracy is widely charged in its traditional form and
through statutory cousins like the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”).134  Conspiracy has long been the target
for serious concerns based on the potential for abuse inherent in the
doctrine.135  Those concerns took on another dimension after the Su-
130. See generally Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
101, 102 (2008) (“While the belief that repeat offenders are ‘deserving of greater punish-
ment’ thus seems widespread, there is far more ambivalence among desert theorists on this
issue, and there has been no satisfactory theoretical account of the prevailing view that
recidivists are more culpable.”); Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account,
87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 586 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Recidivism as Omission] (arguing that a
repeat offender is thought to deserve more punishment because we infer that an of-
fender’s prior criminal acts “are not acts out of character” and that the offender “ha[s]
character traits that are worthy of extra punishment”); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Danger-
ousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1435–36
(2001) (noting that habitual-offender legislation often imposes “a purely preventive deten-
tion portion that cannot be justified as deserved punishment”).
131. Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289, 305 (1996)
(“After all, [a recidivist’s] behavior and mental state may be effectively identical to that of a
first-time offender, so this would appear to argue for the claim that recidivists in such cases
deserve no more than first-time offenders.”).
132. But cf. Lee, Recidivism as Omission, supra note 130, at 577, 610 (arguing that failure R
to correct past criminal behavior—“his failure to take steps to prevent himself from com-
mitting another crime”—justifies increased punishment).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (“The Court has
repeatedly said that the essence of a conspiracy is ‘an agreement to commit an unlawful
act.’” (quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975))).
134. Cf. Beth Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 777, 777–79 (2001) (“Conspiracy, the prosecutor’s ‘darling,’ is one of the most com-
monly charged federal crimes.” (footnote omitted)).
135. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 386–87 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that since “[e]very overt act done in aid of [the conspiracy] . . . is attributed to the
conspirators, and if that means that the conspiracy is present as such wherever any overt
act is done, it might be at the choice of the Government to prosecute in any one of twenty
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preme Court’s decision in Pinkerton v. United States,136 which allowed
for co-conspirators to be punished as primary agents in crimes perpe-
trated by their co-conspirators in the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.137  Particularly in lengthy or open-ended criminal conspir-
acies with multiple objectives, the combination of these legal doc-
trines allows prosecutors to charge relatively minor peripheral players
with long lists of serious crimes in which they had no agency role.138
For these and other reasons, many scholars and jurists have called for
a restriction of conspiracy and RICO liability on grounds that are no-
tably retributivist.139  By contrast, defenses of conspiracy law tend to
be consequentialist in character.140
States in none of which the conspirators had been”); Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal
Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624 (1941) (“In the long category of crimes there is none,
not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of defini-
tive statement than conspiracy.”); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV.
393, 393 (1922) (“A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental
nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quick-
sand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought.”).
136. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
137. Id. at 646–47; see also Note, Vicarious Liability for Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators,
56 YALE L.J. 371, 378 (1947) (criticizing the Pinkerton decision and arguing that “[w]hile
membership in a conspiracy may well be evidence for the jury’s consideration in holding
others than the direct actor guilty, it should not be sufficient, in the absence of some
further showing of knowledge, acquiescence, aid or assistance, to convict one conspirator
for another’s criminal act”).
138. Cf. Milton C. Lorenz, Jr., Comment, Conspiracy in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code:
Too Little Reform, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1973) (“Indiscriminate or reflexive use of the
conspiracy charge by government prosecutors may be equated to a wide dragnet, snaring
members of dangerous criminal syndicates as well as persons who have made questionable
or innocent remarks.” (footnote omitted)).
139. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation
of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239, 303 (1993) (arguing that a
decision on compound liability should “be made only after thoroughly investigating the
nature and imminence of the perils to be guarded against and weighing those perils
against the impact of implementing compound liability, even on a modest scale”); Phillip
E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139–40 (1973) (“The
problem [with conspiracy] is not with particular results, but with the use of a single abstract
concept to decide numerous questions that deserve separate consideration in light of the
various interests and policies they involve.”); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal (pts. 3 & 4), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 947 (1987) (“The requirement of agreement
is further diluted by the frequently repeated doctrine that a conspirator does not need to
agree to, or even to know about, all of the objectives of the conspiracy in order to be liable
for joining it.”); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time To Turn Back from an Ever Ex-
panding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 36 (1992) (“The conclusion
remains inescapable that individuals are being punished more than once for having en-
gaged in a single criminal venture, the conspiratorial agreement.”).
140. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1370–72 (2003)
(arguing that conspiracy law imposes increases in “[t]otal punishment . . . and is justified
because of pernicious group dynamics at work in conspiracy—from polarization to con-
formity, performance success to loyalty”).  It is worth noting that Katyal himself is critical of
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C. Conditions in Many Prisons and Jails Are Harsh by Retributive
Standards
Whitman gives due credit to reform efforts in the late twentieth
century that succeeded in making conditions in American prisons and
jails more humane.141  As he points out, however, that reform move-
ment peaked long ago.142  Consequently, offenders sentenced to
prison in the United States are subjected to a considerable amount of
hard treatment, violence, abuse, and degradation that is neither en-
dorsed by law nor justified by any credible theory of punishment or
penology.143  While the characterization of prisoner-on-prisoner vio-
lence, sexual assault in prison, and post-release discrimination have
been a recent source of debate in the literature, we agree with Flan-
ders, his co-authors, and other participants in that debate that this
sort treatment and the harm it causes are unjustified and should be
remedied.144  To the extent these harms persist in the American sys-
tem, the system is harsh because those in its care are made to suffer
harms that are disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.145
V. CONCLUSION
In his Article, Professor Chad Flanders advances an important de-
bate about whether, and to what extent, the American criminal justice
system is harsh and, if it is, whether retributivism is responsible.146
While Flanders does not offer a clear and succinct definition of harsh,
we have argued here that the most persuasive option is as a pass-
through for disproportionate or otherwise unjustified.147  We then
asked whether criminal justice in the United States generates policies
and outcomes that are disproportionate or otherwise unjustified from
using conspiracy statutes to layer consequences and punishments on peripheral and one-
shot players. Id. at 1334–35.
141. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 59–60. R
142. Id. at 60.
143. See e.g., supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  For a compelling and somewhat R
graphic narrative of how prisoner-on-prisoner violence affects offenders, see GLADIATOR
DAYS: ANATOMY OF A PRISON MURDER (Blowback Productions 2002).
144. See supra note 40. R
145. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)
(“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause.”).
146. See generally Flanders, supra note 31. R
147. See supra Part II.
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a retributive point of view.148  We concluded that it is in three impor-
tant respects: overcriminalization, excessively severe sentences for
some crimes, and tortuous prison conditions.149  Given this conclu-
sion, we think that progressives such as Whitman and Flanders choose
the wrong enemy by blaming retributivism for harshness in American
criminal justice.  Quite contrary to the instincts promoted in their
work, we think that retributivism holds considerable untapped prom-
ise for progressives.
148. See supra Part III.
149. See supra Part IV.A–C.
